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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DIAMOND T. UTAH, INC., a Utah 
corporation, 
Plaintif /-Appellant, 
v. 
TRAVELERS INDEMNITY COM-
P ANY, a corporation authorized to 
do business in the State of Utah, 
PACIFIC FINANCE, INC., a corpo-
ration authorized to do business in 
the State of Utah 
Defendants-Respondents. 
Case No. 
10951 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Defendant-Respondent, Travelers Indemnity Company, 
petition this Court under Rule 76 (e), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, for rehearing and re-argument of the above-
entitled matter. This court erred in its decision of this 
matter dated the 20th day of May, 1968, in the following 
particulars : 
POINT I 
THE COURT'S CONSTRUCTION OF THE 
"SIDE AGREEMENTS" BETWEEN DIAMOND 
T AND PACIFIC FINANCE CORPORATION IS 
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NOT SUPPORTED BY A SCINTILLA OF EVI-
DENCE, PLEADING OR TESTIMONY BY 
DEPOSITION IN THE RECORD HEREIN AND 
THIS COURT'S CONSTRUCTION IS CON-
TRARY TO DIAMOND T UTAH'S PLEADINGS 
AND CONTENTIONS AND CONTRARY TO 
PACIFIC FINANCE COMPANY'S CONTEN-
TIONS AND THIS COURT INCORRECTLY 
STATES CONCLUSIONS ABOUT SAID "SIDE 
AGREEMENTS" AS FOLLOWS: (1) "THERE 
EXISTS SOME 'SIDE AGREEMENT' BE-
TWEEN DIAMOND T AND PACIFIC AND 
THERE IS NO DISPUTE ABOUT THE FACT 
THAT WHENEVER A VEHICLE WAS RE-
POSSESSED DIAMOND T HAD THE DUTY 
TO IMMEDIATELY TAKE IT OVER AND BE 
RESPONSIBLE FOR IT." (2) "APPELLANT, 
(DIAMOND T) STILL RETAINED AN INSUR-
ABLE INTEREST IN SAID PROPERTY BY 
REASON OF ITS SIDE AGREEMENT WITH 
PACIFIC," (3) "IN ADDITION TO ACCEPT-
ING THE PAPER AND COLLECTING THE 
PAYMENTS THE PACIFIC FINANCE, INC. 
HELPED TO LOCATE VEHICLES UPON 
WHICH PAYMENTS HAD BECOME DELIN-
QUENT," AND (4) "THE RECORD IS SILENT 
AS TO WHAT HAPPENED DURING THE 
NEXT PERIOD OF TIME (AFTER REPOS-
SION BY PACIFIC FINANCE CORPORATION, 
THE LEGAL TITLE HOLDER). THIS INTER-
REGNUM WAS SHATTERED WHEN THE VE-
HICLE BECAME INVOLVED IN AN ACCI-
DENT AND WAS WRECKED." 
POINT II 
THERE IS NOT A SCINTILLA OF EVIDENCE, 
PLEADING OR TESTIMONY BY DEPOSITION 
IN THE RECORD HEREIN WHICH SUPPORTS 
2 
THIS COURT'S "PREMISE THAT APPELLANT 
STILL RETAINED AN INSURABLE INTER-
EST IN SAID PROPERTY BY REASON OF 
ITS SIDE AGREEMENT WITH PACIFIC 
FINANCE CORPORATION AFTER REPOS-
SESSION." THE "CLEAR" LANGUAGE OF 
THE INSURANCE POLICY WHICH IS "NOT 
SUSCEPTIBLE TO MORE THAN ONE INTER-
PRETATION" AS DECIDED BY THIS COURT 
HEREIN DOES NOT PERMIT A CONCLUSION 
THAT DIAMOND T'S "INSURABLE INTER-
EST," WAS COVERED BY THE POLICY. 
POINT III 
THIS COURT'S DECISION HEREIN IMPROP-
ERLY APPLIES RULE 56, UTAH RULES OF 
CIVIL PROCEDURE TO THE RECORD HERE-
IN BY DECIDING: "ONE GENUINE ISSUE OF 
FACT REMAINS, TO-WIT: WHETHER THE 
VEHICLE IN QUESTION WAS ... STOLEN ... 
OR DRIVEN AWAY ... WITH THE CONSENT 
OF THE LEGAL TITLE HOLDER .... SHOULD 
IT BE ASCERTAINED THAT THE VEHICLE 
WAS STOLEN .... THEN ON THE PREMISE 
THAT APPELLANT STILL RETAINED AN IN-
SURABLE INTEREST IN SAID PROPERTY 
BY REASON OF ITS SIDE AGREEMENT ... 
PLAINTIFF MAY RECOVER." THERE ARE 
MATERIAL ISSUES OF FACT IN THE REC-
ORD CONCERNING THE CONSTRUCTION OF 
THE "SIDE AGREEMENTS" WHEN THIS 
COURT CONSTRUES THEM CONTRARY TO 
THE CONTENTIONS OF THE APPELLANT, 
DIAMOND T, WHICH RESPONDENT, TRAV-
ELERS, HAS TO ACCEPT WHEN MAKING A 
MOTION TO DISMISS WHICH IS TREATED 
AS A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
UNDER RULES 12 (b) and 56, UTAH RULES 
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. 
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BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF 
REHEARING 
POINT I 
THE COURT'S CONSTRUCTION OF THE 
"SIDE AGREEMENTS" BETWEEN DIAMOND 
T AND PACIFIC FINANCE CORPORATION 
IS NOT SUPPORTED BY A SCINTILLA OF 
EVIDENCE, PLEADING OR TESTIMONY BY 
DEPOSITION IN THE RECORD HEREIN AND 
THIS COURT'S CONSTRUCTION IS CON-
TRARY TO DIAMOND T UTAH'S PLEADINGS 
AND CONTENTIONS AND CONTRARY TO 
PACIFIC FINANCE COMPANY'S CONTEN-
TIONS AND THIS COURT INCORRECTLY 
STATES CONCLUSIONS ABOUT "SIDE 
AGREEMENTS" AS FOLLOWS: (1) "THERE 
EXISTS SOME 'SIDE AGREEMENT' BE-
TWEEN DIAMOND T AND PACIFIC AND 
THERE IS NO DISPUTE ABOUT THE FACT 
THAT WHENEVER A VEHICLE WAS RE-
POSSESSED DIAMOND T HAD THE DUTY 
TO IMMEDIATELY TAKE IT OVER AND BE 
RESPONSIBLE FOR IT." (2) "APPELLANT, 
(DIAMOND T) STILL RETAINED AN INSUR-
ABLE INTEREST IN SAID PROPERTY BY 
REASON OF ITS SIDE AGREEMENT WITH 
PACIFIC," (3) "IN ADDITION TO ACCEPT-
ING THE PAPER AND COLLECTING THE 
PAYMENTS THE PACIFIC FINANCE, INC., 
HELPED TO LOCATE VEHICLES UPON 
WHICH PAYMENTS HAD BECOME DELIN-
QUENT," AND ( 4) "THE RECORD IS SILENT 
AS TO WHAT HAPPENED DURING THE 
NEXT PERIOD OF TIME (AFTER REPOSSES-
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SION BY PACIFIC FINANCE CORPORATION, 
THE LEGAL TITLE HOLDER). THIS INTER-
REGNUM WAS SHATTERED WHEN THE 
VEHICLE BECAME INVOLVED IN AN ACCI-
DENT AND WAS WRECKED." 
The "side agreements" which were casually men-
tioned in this Court's opinion and which were a keystone 
in resolving this matter must have been the written con-
tracts between Pacific Finance Corporation and Diamond 
T Utah. The contracts concern Pacific Finance Com-
pany's purchase of Diamond T's paper. The agreements 
appear to be inconsistent. The affect of the intent and 
conduct of the parties to the agreements is important. 
Pacific Finance and Diamond T disputed their respective 
rights, interests, duties and liabilities under the agreements 
up until the day before oral argument. Pacific Finance 
and Diamond T compromised and settled their differences 
at that time and appellant's action against Pacific has been 
dismissed. Travelers was compelled to accept Diamond 
T's construction of the "side agreements" when it made 
its motion to dismiss. 
The "side agreements" did not create a material issue 
of fact if construed according to appellant Diamond T's 
contentions and the uncontroverted record. Any other con-
struction, including this Court's, which is contrary to Dia-
mond T's position and to this record causes material issues 
of facts in the record concerning the construction of the 
"side agreements." 
In this case the record reveals the following intent, 
conduct and agreements between Diamond T and Pacific 
which do not support this Court's construction of the "side 
agreements." 
After Diamond T conditionally sold the vehicle to David 
Scott under the conditional sales contract at page 146 of 
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this record, it assigned all of its seller's interest or title to 
the truck to Pacific Finance Corporation by a written as-
signment entitled "Assignment and Repurchase Agree-
ment." That assignment was printed on the back of the 
conditional sales contract. The assignment is at page 148 
of this record. The conditional sales contract and assign-
ment were executed by Diamond T on January 23, 1961. 
In part, the "Assignment and Repurchase Agreement" 
reads: 
"For Value Received, I hereby sell, assign and 
transfer unto PACIFIC FINANCE CORPORA-
TION, its Subsidiaries or Affiliates (hereinafter 
called assignee) the within described contract, title 
to, and the property in said contract mentioned; I 
guarantee, warrant and agree to def end the title 
to said property against all lawful claims and de-
mands ; I agree that if the assignee shall repossess 
said property for failure of the purchaser to perform 
any of the conditions of said contract, and shall 
deliver said property to my place of business within 
ninety ( 90) days after the due date of the oldest un-
paid instalment (excluding pickup payments and 
time property required to be held for legal sale, 
where required by state law) per contract, I will 
pay the balance remaining under said contract with-
in ( 30) days after delivery or on demand at election 
of assignee; but no such delivery shall be required 
to be made to me if at the time of such repossession 
I am no longer in the automobile business or am 
deemed by the assignee to be an unsafe risk, in 
either of which events the assignee shall have full 
right to sell such property as provided in said con-
tract and I will upon demand pay to the assignee 
all sums provided in said contract to be paid by the 
purchaser after sale. Should the automobile be 
repossessed solely as the result of one accidental 
collision or overturning, then I shall be relieved of 
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my liability hereunder up to the amount of the cost 
of repairing the damage done by said collision or 
overturning only, not to exceed, however, the sound 
value of the property at the time collision or over-
turning. I understand that title to said property 
remains in the assignee until the contract balance 
shall be fully paid, and I agree that in the event of 
my failure to pay the amounts herein agreed to be 
paid in the event of deliyery of said property to my 
place of business, or in the event I am deemed by 
the assignee to be an unsafe risk, then in either 
event the assignee may take possession and make 
sale of the property as in the contract provided. 
* * *" (Emphasis added.) 
Appellant, Diamond T, argued, plead and by its presi-
dent testified that the repurchase provisions of the assign-
ment did not become operative prior to the loss of the 
vehicle because Pacific did not deliver the vehicle to it at 
Salt Lake or the place of repossession within the "ninety 
(90) days" recited in the "Assignment and Repurchase 
Agreement." It has continuously been Diamond T's position 
that delivery of the vehicle within "ninety (90) days after 
due date of the oldest unpaid installment" is a condition 
precedent to Diamond T's obtaining or regaining legal title 
to the vehicle. Diamond T has always contended that it 
did not obtain or regain title to the vehicle before the vehicle 
was damaged while in possession of the conditional 
purchaser. 
At paragraphs 7, 8, 9 and 10 Diamond T's second 
amended complaint (R-23) Diamond T pleads: 
"7. That the assignment and Repurchase 
Agreement on the conditional sales contract pro-
vides ... 'I, (Diamond T Utah, Inc.) agree that if 
the assignee (Pacific Finance, Inc.) shall repossess 
said property for failure of the purchaser to per-
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form any of the conditions of said contract, and shall 
deliver said property to my place of business within 
ninety (90) days after the due date of the oldest 
unpaid instalment (excluding pickup payments and 
time property required to be held for legal sale, 
where required by state law) per contract, I will 
pay the balance remaining under said contract 
within thirty ( 30) days after delivery ... ,' 
"8. That Pacific Finance Inc .... on the 16th 
day of June, 1961, ... attempted to repossess the 
unit in Madison, Wisconsin; and after taking pos-
session, parked the same at Chief Auto Parts Body 
Shop at 1208 E. Broadway, Madison, Wisconsin, and 
failed to store it properly or to obtain storage re-
ceipts and credentials from the company the unit 
was left with. 
"9. That the unit was left unguarded, and the 
purchaser, seeing the unit, regained possession of 
it and drove it away and sometime later totally 
wrecked the same-the value being $22,341.67 less 
the salvage value. 
"10. That plaintiff has never received the unit 
as required, and under the terms of the contract is 
not obligated to pay Pacific Finance, Inc. for the 
same." 
At pages 7, 8, 9 and 10 of Diamond T's brief sub-
mitted to this Court and in this record it argues that the 
repurchase provisions of the "Assignment and Repurchase 
Agreement" did not operate to vest Diamond T with title 
prior to the loss of the vehicle. Diamond T's conclusion is 
based upon Pacific Finance corporation's failure to deliver 
the vehicle to it within "ninety (90) days." It argues that 
delivery is a condition precedent to its repurchase of the 
vehicle from Pacific. At page 10 of Diamond T's brief the 
argument reads : 
"If Pacific had meant the unconditional guaran-
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tee contract to be the contract that would govern 
the relations of the parties hereto, there would be 
no obligation to repossess, but the course of action of 
both parties has been to have Pacific repossess the 
vehicles and return the possession to appellant prior 
to charging appellant under the recourse agreement, 
and this conduct would mean that the parties them-
selves in interpreting their own contracts meant the 
assignment and repurchase agreement to be the 
operating agreement." 
At page 60 of the record, Diamond T submits the fol-
lowing argument: 
"The argument that the defendant, Pacific Fi-
nance, Inc. has no right to recover is based on the 
provision in the assignment and repurchase agree-
ment set forth on the back of the conditional sales 
contract which provides that if the assignee de-
fendant, Pacific Finance, Inc., repossesses the 
property, that delivery of the property will be made 
to the plaintiff before plaintiff is required to re-
purchase the contract. The exception to this is if a 
determination is made that the plaintiff is an unsafe 
risk or has quit dealing in automobiles which excep-
tion is not pertinent." 
"Since the defendant Pacific Finance, Inc., did 
not return the repossessed vehicle as it was de-
stroyed prior to its being returned, then the plaintiff 
is not liable or responsible for the payment to the 
defendant Pacific Finance, Inc., of any monies due 
on the contract." (Emphasis Added) 
Mr. 0. J. Wilkinson, President of Diamond T, testified 
that Diamond T did not receive any interest in the vehicle 
before the accident in which the vehicle received damage 
while in possession of the conditional purchaser. The 
transcript of his deposition relevant to Diamond T's "side 
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agreements" with Pacific begins at page 131 of this rec-
ord. In part it reads with italics added to emphasize the 
incorrect conclusions by this Court, as follows : 
THE WITNESS: Well, simply they (Pacific) re-
possessed-took the truck from the man's possession 
and left it. 
Q. (By Mr. Callister) Took the truck from whose 
possession? 
A. I don't know whether it was the owner of the 
truck or his driver, but they had the truck in their 
possession. 
Q. How do you know this? 
A. They called me on the phone and told me. 
Q. They called you? 
A. Yes. 
Q. When did they call you? 
A. Oh, a day or so after they had gotten it. 
Q. Which would be about when? 
A. I couldn't tell you exactly what day, but they 
gave me that information. 
Q. Well, you say that they repossessed it or at-
tempted to repossess it on June 16th? 
A. Well, they did repossess it to the best of my 
knowledge, and had it in their possession. 
Q. They called you a couple of days after June 
16th? 
A. I couldn't tell you exactly. 
Q. Was it after the repossession or attempted re-
possession? 
A. Yes, after. 
* * * 
Q. And what, to the best of your recollection, what 
was the substance of the conversation? What did you 
say and what did he say? 
A. He just called me and told me that they had re-
possessed this David Scott unit and their office had 
stored it and had sent the keys here (Pacific Fi-
nance's office in Salt Lake City). 
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Q. And what did you say? 
A. I just told them that was fine. There wasn't 
much for me to say. We were trying to get it and 
they had gotten it and said they have stored it and 
the keys were on the way to this (Pacific Finance's) 
office. 
Q. Then in Paragraph 9 you allege that the unit 
was left unguarded and the purchaser, which would 
be, I assume Scott, and then the unit remained in 
their possession and they drove it away and some 
time later totaled the vehicle-wrecked it. Now, 
what facts do you have for these allegations? 
* * * 
Q. Did anyone from Pacific ever tell you those 
facts in Paragraph 9? 
A. Mark Ames (Pacific's agent in Salt Lake City) 
told me that the owner had apparently taken the 
truck. I don't think he was sure who had taken it. 
Q. When did he tell you this ? 
A. Oh, several days after. I wouldn't be able to 
tell you just when. 
Q. Several days after this last conversation that 
you had with him that you refer to? 
A. Yes. Also he told me that he had the keys there, 
too. 
Q. Which he received from Wisconsin? 
A. Yes, from their office wherever it is. I'm not 
certain. 
Q. Now, do you know what happened to the trailer 
or these units that are described? You allege they 
were wrecked. 
A. Yes. They were totally wrecked. I had them 
hauled into Salt Lake. 
Q. From where? 
A. Oh, Indiana-I have forgotten the name of the 
town. I will check that. I have forgotten the name 
of the town. It was where they were wrecked. I 
believe it was South Bend but I'm not absolutely 
certain. 
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Q. Do you know who wrecked the units? 
A. Well, Scott was hurt pretty bad and he was in 
the hospital. I guess he was there. I don't have any 
way of knowing. 
Q. Now, how did you get possession of these units? 
A. I got them from the garage, picked them up. 
Q. You did this yourself? 
A. I didn't, no. I sent a truck. 
Q. I mean, you or your agents? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And Pacific Finance had nothing to do with 
that? 
A. They told me where they were. Their people 
went there and checked them out and found every-
thing out about them and told me they had insurance 
on them and when we found out the policy in the file, 
it had elapsed, and so when this determined that 
there was no insurance-it went on for several 
months, and fina,lly I picked them (tractor-trailer) 
up at their (Pacific's) request. 
Q. Now, in paragraph 10 you allege that Pacific 
Finance ... deducted , .. the balance on the vehicles 
at the time. 
* * * 
Q. . .. You claim that they deducted the value from 
your reserves and charged this to your account, is 
that correct? 
A. That's right. 
* * 
Q. You claim they didn't have that right? 
A. Well, I claim that they (Pacific) have a further 
responsibility of this unit. 
Q. What? 
A. And there has never been a settlement on it to 
whose responsibility it is. (Pacific or Diamond T) 
* * * 
(R-139 line 2) : 
Q. Now, in paragraph 11, Mr. Wilkinson, you allege 
that Pacific Finance was negligent in repossessing 
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the vehicle and leaving it parked by the side of the 
road unguarded without obtaining proper storage re-
ceipts, credentials, from the company that the unit 
was stored with. Now, where did you get this infor-
mation? 
A. Well, Pacific Finance office couldn't give me 
any receipts whatsoever for storing it. They left it 
with somebody and that was all they knew about it. 
* * * 
Q. (By Mr. Callister) What basis was that? 
A. Pacific Finance had no receipts of storage." 
Mr. Wilkinson testified at another deposition. His fol-
lowing testimony commences at page 162 of the record: 
"Q. Now when did you first learn that Mr. Scott 
was delinquent in his payments to Pacific Finance? 
A. I wouldn't be able to tell you. 
Q. Would it be sometime after they (Pacific) re-
possessed it? 
A. Oh no, several months before. He was delin-
quent for several months before they repossessed it. 
He was in a very bad delinquent situation for a 
month or two while they (Pacific) were trying to 
find it and they (Pacific) couldn't even find it. 
Q. I think your attorney has set out in his com-
plaint that the repossession took place on June 16, 
1961, in Madison, Wisconsin; would that be correct 
as near as you recall? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Had you made any attempt to locate Mr. Scott 
and have him bring these delinquencies current? 
A. Well they always advise me and I ordinarily do 
try to help locate him but whether I had talked to 
him or not I don't remember. 
Q. Do you ever remember that you talked to him 
about the time of the repossession? 
A. I talked to him the day following the reposses-
sion. 
Q. Was that by telephone? 
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A. Yes. 
Q. Where was he at that time as near as you can 
remember? 
A. I think he was in Edgerton, Wisconsin, but I 
am not absolutely certain. 
Q. Edgerton? 
A. Yes. I think he had some people that lived there. 
And they secured the truck from a driver, repos-
sessed it from his driver. 
Q. When you say "they,'' are you referring to Pa-
cific Finance? 
A. Pacific Finance, yes. 
Q. And then right after it was repossessed did he 
call you on the telephone? 
A. The following day he called me. 
Q. What was the substance of the conversation as 
near as you can remember? 
A. He wanted to know what he had to do to get the 
truck back. 
Q. What did you tell him? 
A. I told him he had to bring Pacific Finance up to 
date and that whatever they decided there, whatever 
Pacific Finance decided would be agreeable with me,· 
but that he would have to contact them (Pacific) 
and bring them up to date. 
* * 
Q. Do you remember saying . . . to him, 'Get the 
unit back on the road and see if you can keep it 
operating'? 
A. No, sir, I never did tell him to get the unit back 
on the road without payment. I told him that the 
first thing he bad to do was bring the payments 
up to date. 
Q. Was anything else said as near as you can re-
member in that conversation? 
A. No. As I remember he did not have enough 
money to pay it up to date in full and so I told him 
he would have to go to Pacific Finance and work out 
whatever he wanted to do with them and that would 
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be the only way that the truck could be released, that 
I would not release it and could not release it, and 
that it was up to Pacific Finance to handle it. He 
called me one Saturday morning. 
Q. Did you notify Pacific Finance of this telephone 
call? 
A. Yes, I did Monday. They were not open on Sat-
urday. 
Q. Do you know if he ever made any contact with 
Pacific Finance on the payments? 
A. I don't know whether he did or not. The next 
thing I knew Pacific Finance notified me that the 
truck had been taken from the lot and they were 
trying to run it down to find out what had happened 
to it and who got it and whether it was him, or what 
happened. 
Q. Do you know anything about the details of the 
repossession? 
A. No. 
Q. Have you heard anything about it from Pacific 
Finance? 
A. No. The only thing I know is that they repos-
sessed it from a driver. I don't know the details. 
And I understood they stored it in a parking lot. 
Q. When you say a driver, you mean they re-
possessed it from a driver of Scott's? 
A. Yes. Scott was not on the truck when it was 
repossessed as I understand it. 
Q. Do you know whether they instituted any legal 
proceedings to effect the repossession? 
A. I don't know whether they did or not. I doubt 
that they did. 
Q. You just heard they in effect took it from one 
of his drivers? 
A. They just called me and told me they had picked 
it up and it was stored in-I don't remember, some 
little town in Wisconsin as I remember-and that 
their office was mailing the keys and all, their stor-
age receipt and everything to them here. And I 
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told them, well when they got that, then I would go 
ahead and make arrangements to have it picked up. 
* * * 
Q. The keys may have been left in it? 
A. The keys were sent to Pacific Finance. Whether 
there was an extra key left or not I don't know; but 
a set of keys for it was sent to Pacific Finance." 
Both Pacific Finance Corporation and Diamond T Utah 
admitted that there were certain other agreements between 
them. They contended that all of the relevant agreements 
are found at pages 144, 145, 146, 147 and 148 of the record 
herein. In addition to the conditional sales contract with 
the "Assignment and Repurchase Agreement" on the back, 
they had a written "Unconditional Guarantee Agreement" 
and "Agreement to Furnish Insurance and Agreement to 
Furnish Ownership Certificate." 
The "Unconditional Guarantee" agreement provided: 
"I (or we), hereby agree that, notwithstanding any 
assignments appearing on any conditional sales con-
tract or any other existing agreements between my-
self and Pacific Finance Corporation, my assign-
ments shall be deemed an unconditional guarantee 
assignment on any contract of conditional sale here-
after assigned to and purchased by Pacific Finance 
Corporation from me, * * * 
The "Agreement to Furnish Insurance and Agreement 
to Furnish Ownership Certificate" provided that Diamond 
T would cause insurance "with long form loss payable en-
dorsement in Pacific Finance's favor" (R-147). It further 
provided that Diamond T would deliver title documents of 
the vehicles sold under conditional sale contracts which 
were assigned to Pacific showing the purchaser as owner and 
Pacific as lienholder (R-147). The conditions for Diamond 
T's furnishing Pacific with title documents does not con-
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flict with the "Assignment and Repurchase Agreement." The 
condition for furnishing insurance with Pacific as loss 
payee was inconsistent with Diamond T's contention that the 
conditional purchaser, Scott, or in the alternative, Pacific 
had the duty to cause insurance before Pacific could collect 
under the "Unconditional Guarantee." Both Pacific and 
Diamond T intended that collision insurance with Scott as 
named insured and with Pacific as loss payee would cover 
the damage to the vehicle herein. Such a policy was pur-
chased but Pacific and Scott permitted it to lapse prior to 
the wreck. Diamond T did not claim Traveler's policy herein 
covered the loss until it found that the only policy which 
could have covered the loss had lapsed. 
The record clearly supports Diamond T's construction 
of the "Assignment and Repurchase Agreement." The facts 
and law support Pacific Finance Corporation's contentions 
concerning the "Unconditional Guarantee Agreement" with 
Diamond T. There was no "Repurchase" by Diamond T and 
Pacific collected from Diamond T under an "Unconditional 
Guarantee." The record does not support this Court's con-
struction of the "side agreements." This Court creates a 
material issue of fact by interjecting a construction peculiar 
to any position heretofore taken by the parties. 
Neither Travelers nor Diamond T contended "there is 
no dispute about the fact that whenever a vehicle was repos-
sessed Diamond T had the duty to immediately take it over 
and be responsible for it." And, the record is not silent con-
cerning relevant events after repossession. There was no 
relevant "interregnum." Both appellant, Diamond T, and 
respondent, Travelers, contended that Pacific had the only 
right and duty to repossess the vehicle. Diamond T con-
tended that it had no duty nor interest in the vehicle until 
Pacific returned the vehicle to it within the "ninety (90) 
day" period in the "Assignment and Repurchase Agree-
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ment." There was no relevant "interregnum" or pause in 
the series of events or in the control of the vehicle by the 
parties with an interest in the property. Diamond T Utah, 
by 0. J. Wilkinson, admitted at his deposition that he had 
no right or power to release the truck to Scott. Pacific 
Finance Corporation allegedly collected the balance owing 
on the conditional sales contract under the "Unconditional 
Guarantee Agreement." Pacific did not demand the bal-
ance of Scott's obligation until after the wreck. And, 
Diamond T's payment under the "Unconditional Guarantee 
Agreement" had nothing to do with any interest in the 
security. No reassignment or scintilla of a reassignment to 
Diamond T was made before the wreck of the vehicle. 
Diamond T did contend that it had an insurable interest 
as a result of the unconditional guarantee agreement be-
tween Pacific and Diamond T. The record does not support 
any conclusion that Diamond T obtained any insurable inter-
est in the vehicle as a result of the "Assignment and Repur-
chase Agreement" because it was not delivered to Diamond 
T or Diamond T did not take possession of the vehicle at any 
place it was being held by Pacific until after the vehicle sus-
tained damage in the "wreck." The record supports and 
Diamond T admits that Diamond T was not vested with any 
legal title or property interest in the vehicle prior to the 
wreck. This Court has decided that a conditional seller 
loses all interest in the chattel sold or in the conditional sales 
contract when the conditional seller assigns his interest to a 
third party, Stains v. Peterson, 74 Utah 256, 279 P. 53 
(1929), and Harrison v. Otto Securities Company, 70 Utah 
11, 257 P. 677 (1927). The guarantee agreement does not 
create a property right nor reserve one to Diamond T after 
Diamond T assigned the contract to Pacific. 
Pacific Finance Corporation contended that under the 
terms of the "Continuing Unconditional Guarantee Agree-
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ment" the finance company was empowered to release the 
security at its discretion and that it owed no duty whatso-
ever to Diamond T for the insurance coverage of the secur-
ity or for the exercise of proper control over the security 
(R-25-27). Pacific Finance Corporation correctly concludes 
at page 23 of its brief: 
"Under the ... Unconditional Guarantee Agreement, 
the ownership would be irrelevant, since Pacific 
was empowered to release the security completely." 
Diamond T entered into the "Continuing Unconditional 
Guarantee Agreement" with Pacific to induce it to purchase 
its conditional sales contracts. The primary inducement to 
Pacific was Diamond T's waiver of any rights it had in the 
security under any assignment it had made or would make 
to Pacific. Diamond T promised Pacific that it would abso-
lutely and unconditionally guarantee a conditional purchas-
er's obligation under a conditional sales contract without 
regard to any duty or condition precedent imposed upon 
Pacific in the "Assignment and Repurchase Agreement" on 
the back of the contracts Pacific purchased. Pacific's con-
struction of the contracts is supported by decisions of the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. In 
Heaston Tractor and Implement Co. v. Securities Acceptance 
Co., (CA-10) 243 F.2d 197 (1952), and U.S. v. Newton 
Livestock Option Market, (CA-10), 336 F.2d 673 (1964), 
the Court construed "unconditional guarantee agreements." 
In both cases the guarantors, defendants, contended that the 
creditors, plaintiffs, had increased the risk of liability on 
the guarantee agreements by failure to exercise due care in 
protecting the security the guarantors' principals had given 
the creditors, plaintiffs. In both cases the court held that 
the guarantors had waived all interest in the security by the 
unconditional guarantees. That is exactly what happened 
in the case at bar. Diamond T changed its arrangements 
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with Pacific from one of "Repurchase," with certain condi-
tions which never occurred herein imposed upon Pacific, to 
one of "Unconditional Guarantee" whereby Diamond T 
waived all interest in the security and unconditionally guar-
anteed the obligation of Scott. The only controlling agree-
ment was the "Unconditional Guarantee." Conditions in the 
other "side agreements" were waived by it. 
The "Unconditional Guarantee Agreement" may be an 
insurable interest but it is not an interest insured by the 
unambiguous language in the policy. The policy covered 
automobiles in the possession of Diamond T as owner or 
consignee and held for sale. Diamond T did not regain 
possession of the vehicle nor an interest in the vehicle after 
repossession nor before the wreck. Diamond T did not suffer 
any loss as a result of the wreck because it didn't have any 
interest in the vehicle. Diamond T's liability on the "Uncon-
ditional Guarantee Agreement" was a liability on contract 
which had nothing to do with the security for Scott's obli-
gation under the conditional sales contract. 
POINT II 
THERE IS NOT A SCINTILLA OF EVIDENCE, 
PLEADING OR TESTIMONY BY DEPOSITION 
IN THE RECORD HEREIN WHICH SUPPORTS 
THIS COURT'S "PREMISE THAT APPELLANT 
STILL RETAINED AN INSURABLE INTER-
EST IN SAID PROPERTY BY REASON OF ITS 
SIDE AGREEMENT WITH PACIFIC FINANCE 
CORPORATION AFTER REPOSSESSION." 
THE "CLEAR" LANGUAGE OF THE IN-
SURANCE POLICY WHICH IS "NOT 
SUSCEPTIBLE TO MORE THAN ONE IN-
TERPRETATION" AS DECIDED BY THIS 
COURT HEREIN DOES NOT PERMIT A CON-
CLUSION THAT DIAMOND T'S "INSURABLE 
INTEREST," WAS COVERED BY THE POLICY. 
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This Court decided that the language in the policy is 
"clear and not susceptible of more than one interpretation." 
That clear and unambiguous language defines property cov-
ered as follows : 
"l. Property Covered-The policy covers auto-
mobiles (a) consigned to or owned by the insured 
and held for sale or used in the insured's business 
as an automobile dealer including repair service or 
as demonstrators, exclusive of automobiles leased 
or rented to others, and automobiles sold by the in-
sured under bailment le:;i.se, conditional sale, pur-
chase agreement, mortgage or other encumbrance; 
... " (Emphases added) 
Then, this Court decided that Diamond T may recover 
under the policy "on the premise it has an insurable interest" 
as a result of the "side agreements" discussed under Point I. 
The Court errs in deciding that "an insurable interest" is 
covered by the unambiguous language in the policy. An in-
sured should only be entitled to recover if his interest was 
insured under the policy. 
Pacific had all of the property interest in the vehicle 
if it properly repossessed the vehicle at the time of reposses-
sion, except for the equitable rights of the purchaser, Scott, 
and before it assigned it to Diamond T after the wreck. 
Stains v. Peterson, 74 Utah 256, 279 P. 53 (1929); American 
States Insurance v. White, 341 Ill. App. Ct. Repts. 422, 94 
N.E.2d 95 (1950); and Jensen Used Cars v. Rice, 7 Utah 2d 
276, 323 P.2d 259 (1959). 
From the time of repossession until the wreck, Diamond 
T never, at any time, owned the vehicle or had the vehicle 
consigned to it and "held it for sale." 
During the critical period of time, the date of the re-
taking by Scott or the date of the wreck, Diamond T had no 
interest in the property which was within the terms of 
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"property covered" in the policy or which was outside the 
exclusion of "automobiles .. sold by insured .. " The policy 
requires, as a condition precedent to coverage, that Diamond 
T be a consignee or owner and have possession of the ve-
hicle at the time of damage. The "side agreements" and 
record discussed and quoted in Point I reveal no basis to 
conclude the language in the policy covered the vehicle at 
the critical time. Meyer v. Hardware Mutual Casualty Co. 
(Texas) 383 S.W2d 625 (1964); Dardeen v. Greyhound 
Corporation, (Ky.) 412 S.W.2d 585 (1967) and 23 ALR2d 
796 supplemented in 3 ALR2d Later Case Service 578. 
In Fountain v. Importers and Exporters Insurance Co. 
(Wisc.) 252 N.W. 569 (1934), the plaintiff had a contract 
of insurance with the defendant which expressly covered 
automobiles subject to a mortgage. The policy did not have 
the narrow definition of "property covered" as the policy in 
the case at bar. The plaintiff, automobile dealer, had a 
financing arrangement with one named Fleming. Fleming 
would loan money to Fountain, plaintiff, for the purchase 
of automobiles and Fountain would give Fleming a mortgage 
on the automobiles. When Fountain conditionally sold auto-
mobiles all of the interest in the automobiles was assigned 
to the purchaser of the automobile and Fleming. Fountain 
would repossess the automobiles from customers in default 
and hold them on his lot for sale. Fleming did not reassign 
any interest to Fountain while he held the repossessed auto-
mobiles for sale. A fire destroyed the repossessed automo-
biles. The trial court found defendant insurance company 
liable on its policy. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin re-
versed and held that plaintiff, Fountain, the automobile 
dealer, had no insurable interest in the cars unless there was 
a reassignment before the fire by Fleming to Fountain, the 
dealer. 
Diamond T contends there was no reassignment before 
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the alleged theft or wreck. And, Diamond T's "Uncondi-
tional Guarantee Agreement" was a liability separate from 
any property interest in the vehicle which is not insured 
under Traveler's policy. Hudiburg Chevrolet Inc. v. Globe 
Indemnity, (Tex.) 383 S.W.2d 65 (1964). 
Pacific could have given away the security or waived 
any right to it and Diamond T would be liable to Pacific on 
the "Unconditional Guarantee." Certainly, Travelers does 
not insure Diamond T's liability on the guarantee when it 
has no relation to a property or possessory interest in the 
vehicle. It appears obvious that Travelers intended to insure 
automobiles in the possession of Diamond T as part of 
Diamond T's inventory of used vehicles but Travelers did 
not intend to insure vehicles sold to third parties as Pacific 
or Scott. 23 ALR2d 796. 
POINT III 
THIS COURT'S DECISION HEREIN IMPROP-
ERLY APPLIES RULE 56, UTAH RULES OF 
CIVIL PROCEDURE TO THE RECORD HERE-
IN BY DECIDING: "ONE GENUINE ISSUE OF 
FACT REMAINS, TO-WIT: WHETHER THE 
VEHICLE IN QUESTION WAS .. STOLEN OR 
DRIVEN AWAY .. WITH THE CONSENT OF 
THE LEGAL TITLE HOLDER. ... SHOULD IT 
BE ASCERTAINED THAT THE VEHICLE WAS 
STOLEN ... THEN ON THE PREMISE THAT 
APPELLANT STILL RETAINED AN INSUR-
ABLE INTEREST IN SAID PROPERTY BY 
REASON OF ITS SIDE AGREEMENT ... 
PLAINTIFF MAY RECOVER." THERE ARE 
MATERIAL ISSUES OF FACT IN THE REC-
ORD CONCERNING THE CONSTRUCTION OF 
THE "SIDE AGREEMENTS" WHEN THIS 
COURT CONSTRUES THEM CONTRARY TO 
THE CONTENTIONS OF THE APPELLANT, 
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DIAMOND T, WHICH RESPONDENT, TRAV-
ELERS, HAS TO ACCEPT WHEN MAKING A 
MOTION TO DISMISS WHICH IS TREATED 
AS A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
UNDER RULES 12 (b) and 56, UTAH RULES OF 
CIVIL PROCEDURE. 
Diamond T and Pacific had an action and appeal pend-
ing herein before they compromised and settled their differ-
ences concerning the construction of the "side agreements." 
When Travelers made its motion at the trial court, it 
assumed that Diamond T's construction of the Conditional 
Sale Contract, Assignment and Repurchase Agreement and 
Unconditional Guarantee Agreement was true except where 
unsupported in the record or in law. 
Diamond T contended that it did not have any right, 
title or interest in the vehicle after it assigned the conditional 
sales contract to Pacific and before the loss occurred (See 
quotation of record under Point I) . Pacific made a clear 
and convincing record that Diamond T did not have any 
right, title or interest after Pacific received the assignment 
and before the loss. Pacific claimed the "Unconditional 
Guarantee Agreement" was totally unrelated to an interest 
in the vehicle and Diamond T and Pacific contended Pacific 
did not reassign the title or contract to Diamond T before 
loss. 
The only contention Diamond T made about the "side 
agreements" which Travelers denied (R-15, 16) and which 
the record unequivocally controverts is that the vehicle was 
in the constructive possession of Diamond T when Pacific 
repossessed it. Oral J. Wilkinson pierced that allegation 
when he testified that Diamond T never received any pos-
session of the vehicle prior to its being damaged. 
Clearly, this court's construction of the side agreements, 
which were the subject matter of Diamond T's cause of 
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action against Pacific, involved issues of fact. The whole 
relationship between Diamond T and Pacific out of which 
an interest in the vehicle may or may not arise involved 
issues of fact if that relationship is construed contrary to 
the inferences permitted by the uncontested issues of fact 
between the parties. 
It would be unjust to bind Travelers to this court's 
construction of the "side agreements" which is contrary 
to Diamond T's theory. At a trial of the issue concerning the 
construction of the side agreements, Travelers would be 
able to use a substantial part of this record to cause Diamond 
T to admit to its construction of the "side agreements" or to 
impeach. 
Under Rule 56 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, this Court 
correctly decided herein that it is not bound to rule for one 
side or the other when both sides move for summary judg-
ment if a genuine issue of fact exists. A trial must ensue 
as to any remaining disputed fact issue, and, according to 
the decision cited by this court in support of its construction 
of Rule 56, Travelers should be allowed to show a material 
issue of fact exists in the construction of the "side agree-
ments." 
In the decision cited by this Court, Walling v. Richmond 
Screw Anchor Co. (CA-2), 154 F.2d 780, (1946), both 
parties moved for summary judgment. The court said: 
"* * * Although a defendant may, on his own 
motion, assert that, accepting his legal theory, the 
facts are undisputed, he may be able and should al-
ways be allowed to show that, if plaintiffs legal 
theory be adopted, a genuine dispute as to a material 
fact exists." 
Pursuant to the authority cited by this Court, Travelers 
should not be prevented from proving that the "side agree-
ments" should be construed according to Diamond T's con-
tentions, the record herein and the trial court's construction. 
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Lynch v. Webb City School Dist. (Mo.) 418 SW 2d 608, 617 
(1967). According to this court's discussions of Rule 56 in 
Christensen v. Finance Service Co. 14 Utah 2d 101, 377 P.2d 
1010 (1963) ; Lundberg v. Backman, 9 Utah 2d 58, 337 P.2d 
433 (1959) ; and Whitman v. W. T. Grant Co., 16 Utah 2d 81, 
395 P.2d 918 (1964), Travelers was compelled to rely upon 
Diamond T's interpretation of its agreements with Pacific 
in connection with its motion before the trial court. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent, Travelers Indemnity Company, respect-
fully submits this court grant a rehearing and reargument 
and correct the conclusions of this court which are not 
permitted by the law applicable hereto or the record herein. 
Respectfully submitted, 
L. RIDD LARSON of 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
400 Deseret Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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